Infringement Contentions No Substitute for Insufficient Complaint

The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's induced and contributory infringement claims for failure to state a claim. "[Plaintiff] argues that dismissal is not warranted because its infringement contentions identify the direct infringement and describe the acts of the alleged indirect infringer that contribute to or are inducing that direct infringement. [Plaintiff], however, does not cite any authority supporting the proposition that the Court may consider its infringement contentions, which are not set forth in the FAC, in deciding whether it has pled cognizable claims for relief. . . . [Plaintiff] has failed to allege any facts plausibly showing that [defendant] knowingly induced any third party to engage in direct infringement of the [patent-in-suit] with the specific intent of encouraging the infringement. . . . Nor has [plaintiff] alleged that the component of the accused. . . products that practices the patented method has no substantial non-infringing uses, or that the component constitutes a material part of the invention."

Emblaze Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 4-11-cv-01079 (CAND November 27, 2012, Order) (Armstrong, J.).

Prior License of Patents-in-Suit Involving Different Technology Excluded From Evidence

The court granted defendants' motion in limine to preclude plaintiff from presenting testimony regarding the value of one of the defendant's licenses with a third party which contained the patents-in-suit but was directed to different technology. "[A] license is not comparable simply because it contains the patents-in-suit. . . . [T]he fact that the accused products were covered by the license is also insufficient to establish comparability; rather, [plaintiff] must show that the. . . license is technologically comparable to license that would have been reached at the hypothetical negotiation. . . . In addition, the Court concludes that any probative value this license might have would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to [defendant]."

Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., et. al., 3-10-cv-02618 (CASD November 20, 2012, Order) (Huff, J.).

Expert’s Reliance on “Nash Bargaining Solution” In Addition to Other Considerations to Calculate Royalty Rate Did Not Render Opinion Unreliable

The court denied defendant's motion to preclude the royalty estimates testimony of plaintiff's damages expert. "[Defendant] alleges that . . . [the expert's] royalty rate analyses are improperly premised on 'arbitrary profit splits,' such as the '25-percent rule' . . . [Plaintiff] counters that his calculations were influenced, appropriately, by the facts of the case, including the competitive environment and [its] policy of exploiting its own patents. . . . [Plaintiff's expert] explained his methodology as based on a combination of real world observation and the Nash bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution is a mathematical proof. Although it has been criticized as impenetrable, at least one court has permitted its use 'in addition to, rather than in lieu of' other considerations. . . . The Court agrees with [plaintiff] that [its expert's] analysis is tied to the facts of the case. It will not exclude his testimony on this ground."

Gen-Probe Incorporated v. Becton Dickinson and Company, 3-09-cv-02319 (CASD November 26, 2012, Order) (Benitez, J.).

Defense Counsel’s Prior Representation of Plaintiff for “Junior Prosecution Work” Did Not Require Disqualification

The court denied plaintiff's motion to disqualify defense counsel where one of defendant's attorneys was plaintiff's prior patent prosecution attorney. "[The attorney's] work was confined to junior prosecution work on patents unrelated to those in suit, either by specification or by subject matter. There is no evidence that [he] was involved in any discussions of [plaintiff's] strategies for patent prosecution, claim drafting, or licensing/litigation/monetization of their patents. . . . Even assuming that [he] learned of such general confidences indirectly from more senior attorneys . . . it is not apparent at all how confidential knowledge of [plaintiff's] strategies and plans fifteen years ago could be relevant to any issue in this case, or harmful to [plaintiff] in some other way."

Walker Digital LLC v. AXIS Communications AB, et. al., 1-11-cv-00558 (DED November 21, 2012, Order) (Andrews, J.).

Summary Judgment of Noninfringement Against “Patent Troll” Who Filed “Hundreds of Lawsuits” Did Not Warrant Award of Attorneys’ Fees

The court denied defendant's motion for attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 following summary judgment of noninfringement. "[Defendant] characterizes [plaintiff] and its counsel as 'one of the nation’s leading "patent trolls"' who filed suit against [defendant] knowing there was no conceivable infringement. . . . [Defendant] also argues that [plaintiff] acted in bad faith because it has filed hundreds of lawsuits, it routinely engages in 'shakedown tactics' to obtain settlements, and none of its other cases have proceeded to claim construction proceedings. . . . Although [defendant] objects to [plaintiff's] evidence of pre-suit claim charts, there is still insufficient evidence in the record to establish an 'exceptional case' warranting attorneys’ fees. . . . 'Even if plaintiff's pre-suit investigation was unreasonable, an unreasonable investigation alone does not demonstrate that the ensuing litigation was vexatious, unjustified, or brought in bad faith.' . . . Furthermore, evidence that [plaintiff] has filed suit against many other parties does not, by itself, prove that litigation is unjustified or baseless."

ArrivalStar S.A., et. al. v. Meitek Inc., et. al., 2-12-cv-01225 (CACD November 20, 2012, Order) (Selna, J.).

Declaratory Judgment Defendant Enjoined From Pursuing Infringement Claims In Eastern District of Texas

The court granted a declaratory judgment plaintiff's motion for an injunction of defendant's co-pending claims against plaintiff's customers in the Eastern District of Texas because the balance of hardships favored an injunction. "[Defendant] resides and works in this district.' In addition, all of [its] attorneys are located in. . . the Eastern District of Michigan. . . . Further. . ., the Eastern District of Michigan is in reality the venue of first filing since Defendant originally filed two lawsuits [here] against two of the Texas 'customers.' Defendant then abruptly dismissed them, and shuffled down to [Texas] to sue them there. . . . The Court finds it suspicious at best, why [defendant] filed two cases in Detroit separately -- think two different judge draws -- and then apparently not satisfied with the draws, scooted to Texas, where. . . every judge is hospitable to plaintiffs. . . ."

Finisar Corporation v. Cheetah Omni, LLC, 2-11-cv-15625 (MIED November 19, 2012, Order) (Borman, J.).

Sanctions Order Unsealed Following Jury Verdict

The court granted plaintiff's motion to unseal documents related to a sanctions order that were sealed to avoid tainting the jury. "Although the patent trial has concluded, Defendants assert that the same reasons for denying the prior motion require that the Sanctions Order remain under seal. However, the jury has already returned a verdict in the parties’ patent dispute. Moreover, the antitrust trial, docketed to begin [late next year], is still quite remote, and the opportunity for voir dire examination will serve to eliminate any jurors who may have been prejudiced by the unsealing of the Sanctions Order. The Court concludes that the potential for prejudice in the antitrust matter does not justify maintaining the Sanctions Order under seal."

Monsanto Company, et. al. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, et. al., 4-09-cv-00686 (MOED November 16, 2012, Order) (Webber, J.).