Following a jury trial, the court determined that plaintiff's patents were not unenforceable for inequitable conduct under Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, No. 2008-1511, at 18 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2011), because defendants failed to establish intent to deceive. "[The first named inventor of the patents-in-suit] consistently testified in deposition and at trial that he believed there was nothing like his invention prior to September 1998 and that he also believed that no one had even recognized the problem that his invention was designed to solve. . . . [The inventor] was at no time inconsistent regarding the sincerity of his belief that there was no material prior art -- i.e., that he had uncovered a breakthrough invention. Considering [the inventor's] testimony in light of the evidence as a whole, the court concludes that specific intent to deceive is not the single most reasonable inference that must be drawn from the evidence."
Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Systems Corporation, et. al., 2-07-cv-00271 (TXED May 26, 2011, Order) (Everingham, M.J.)
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
No Divided Infringement Of System Claims Where Defendant Does Not "Put Into Service" Every Element Of The Patented System
The court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider the court's earlier ruling that defendant did not infringe under a theory of divided infringement pursuant to Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "In Centillion, the Federal Circuit held that 'to 'use' a system for the purposes of infringement, a party must put the invention into service, i.e., control the system as a whole and obtain benefit from it.'. . . The Federal Circuit found that Qwest's customers put the claimed invention into service even though they used their own computers to trigger processing in Qwest's servers. . . . In contrast, Qwest did not put the invention into service. Like [defendant], Quest makes the back end processing elements, but it never 'uses' the entire claimed system because it never puts into service the personal computer data processing means. Similarly, [defendant] makes the back end processing elements, but it never 'uses' the entire claimed system because it never puts into service the display of said source data stream. The user must click on a hyperlink in order to display said stream."
Kenexa BrassRing Inc. v. Taleo Corporation, 1-07-cv-00521 (DED May 26, 2011, Order) (Robinson, J.)
Kenexa BrassRing Inc. v. Taleo Corporation, 1-07-cv-00521 (DED May 26, 2011, Order) (Robinson, J.)
Friday, May 27, 2011
Sanctions Backfire: Defendant's Baseless Requests for Rule 11 Sanctions May Lead to Sanctions Against Defense Counsel
The court denied defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions and issued a show cause order against defense counsel why he should not be sanctioned for multiple meritless sanctions motions. "Rule 11 sanctions are reserved for instances where, unlike here, 'it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success[.]'. . . Defendant asked three times in the span of one month for the Court to sanction Plaintiff for bringing its complaint. Then, Defendant used [a] supplemental brief . . . as a platform to ask once again for Rule 11 sanctions. All of these requests have been procedurally improper and baseless."
OptiGen, LLC v. Animal Genetics, Inc., 5-10-cv-00940 (NYND May 23, 2011, Order) (Scullin, J.)
OptiGen, LLC v. Animal Genetics, Inc., 5-10-cv-00940 (NYND May 23, 2011, Order) (Scullin, J.)
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Post-Trial TRO Does Not Require Showing of Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The court denied defendants' motion to reconsider the issuance of a TRO pending plaintiffs' appeal and rejected defendants' argument that "a likelihood of success on the merits is a prerequisite for issuing a TRO." "I agree with defendants' argument in the normal course, i.e., when I am asked at the commencement of a case to evaluate its merits. . . . Under the circumstances at bar, however, I conclude that this factor switches from having a gate-keeping function to simply being one of the four factors to be considered when granting or denying an injunction. . . . [A] grant of a TRO post-trial merely preserves the status quo pending appeal; it does not change the status quo as it would at the commencement of a case."
In re: Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation, 1-09-md-02118 (DED May 24, 2011, Order) (Robinson, J.)
In re: Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation, 1-09-md-02118 (DED May 24, 2011, Order) (Robinson, J.)
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
$2.6 Million Attorneys' Fee Award Justified Despite Earlier Sanctions and Enhanced Damages Awards
In granting plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the court rejected defendant's argument that "the purpose for an award of attorney fees has already been accomplished through the sanctions and enhanced damages ordered by this Court. . . . While [defendant] argues that it 'has already paid a very heavy price for the accused conduct and there is no reason to further punish [it] by awarding attorneys’ fees,' the Court would like to emphasize that an award of attorney fees is awarded as compensation to a prevailing party when the Court finds the case to be exceptional, and not because the Court seeks to punish the other party."
Furminator, Inc. v. Kim Laube & Co., 4-08-cv-00367 (MOED May 23, 2011, Order) (Webber, J.)
Furminator, Inc. v. Kim Laube & Co., 4-08-cv-00367 (MOED May 23, 2011, Order) (Webber, J.)
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Plaintiff's Litigation History Negates "Cost of Defense Settlement" Strategy and Eliminates Need to Modify Court's Usual Schedule
The court stated that it would not impose certain changes to its docket and discovery orders despite the fact that plaintiff had sued 95 defendants across 7 cases. "The Court has previously expressed concern about cases where a plaintiff asserts questionable patent claims against a large number of Defendants to extract cost of defense settlements. . . . This however is not one of those cases. Although [plaintiff] asserted the same patent in multiple cases against numerous Defendants and previous cases settled before proceeding to the Markman hearing, [plaintiff] is distinguished by its litigation history. . . . [Its] preparation for the status conference, readiness to provide detailed infringement disclosures, and in camera information regarding the reasonableness of its settlements does not raise the Hobson’s choice concerns that other cases have raised for the Court."
Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Engrasp, Inc. et al, 6-10-cv-00591 (TXED May 20, 2011, Order) (Davis, J.)
Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Engrasp, Inc. et al, 6-10-cv-00591 (TXED May 20, 2011, Order) (Davis, J.)
Monday, May 23, 2011
Mandatory Stay Pending ITC Investigation Does Not Bar Subsequent Transfer of Venue
Defendant's motion to transfer venue was granted and the court rejected plaintiff's argument that a mandatory stay pending resolution of an ITC investigation precluded the court from ruling on the transfer motion. "[Defendant] argues that the motion to transfer does not fall under the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) because the motion does not address a 'claim' or 'same issue' involved in the ITC proceeding. The Court agrees with [defendant's] interpretation of the statute. It would make little sense for the stay to encompass proceedings related to procedural matters that are not before the ITC. The legislative history of § 1659 shows that Congress intended that the stay affect merits issues that involve 'questions of patent validity, infringement, and any defenses that might be raised in both proceedings.'"
Microsoft Corporation v. TiVo Inc., 2-11-cv-00134 (WAWD May 19, 2011, Order) (Martinez, J.)
Microsoft Corporation v. TiVo Inc., 2-11-cv-00134 (WAWD May 19, 2011, Order) (Martinez, J.)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)